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Abstract
Training multi-agent systems (MAS) to achieve realistic equilibria gives us a useful
tool to understand and model real-world systems. We consider a general sum
partially observable Markov game where agents of different types share a single
policy network, conditioned on agent-specific information. This paper aims at
i) formally understanding equilibria reached by such agents, and ii) matching
emergent phenomena of such equilibria to real-world targets. Parameter sharing
with decentralized execution has been introduced as an efficient way to train
multiple agents using a single policy network. However, the nature of resulting
equilibria reached by such agents is not yet understood: we introduce the novel
concept of Shared equilibrium as a symmetric pure Nash equilibrium of a certain
Functional Form Game (FFG) and prove convergence to the latter for a certain class
of games using self-play. In addition, it is important that such equilibria satisfy
certain constraints so that MAS are calibrated to real world data for practical
use: we solve this problem by introducing a novel dual-Reinforcement Learning
based approach that fits emergent behaviors of agents in a Shared equilibrium to
externally-specified targets, and apply our methods to a n-player market example.
We do so by calibrating parameters governing distributions of agent types rather
than individual agents, which allows both behavior differentiation among agents
and coherent scaling of the shared policy network to multiple agents.
1 Introduction
Multi-agent learning in partially observable settings is a challenging task. When all agents have the
same action and observation spaces, the work of Foerster et al. (2016); Gupta et al. (2017) has
shown that using a single shared policy network across all agents represents an efficient training
mechanism. This network takes as input the individual agent observations and outputs individual
agent actions, hence the terminology decentralized execution. The network is trained by collecting
all n agent experiences simultaneously and treating them as distinct sequences of local observations,
actions and rewards experienced by the shared policy. Since agents may have different observations at
a given point in time, sharing a network still allows different behavior across agents. It has also been
observed in these works or in Kaushik et al. (2018) that one can include in the agents’ individual
observations some agent-specific information such as the agent index to further differentiate agents
when using the shared policy, thus allowing a certain form of heterogeneity among agents.
This brings the natural question: from a game theoretic standpoint, what is the nature of potential
equilibria learnt by agents using such a shared policy? We show here that such equilibria are
symmetric pure Nash equilibria of a higher level game on the set of stochastic policies, which we call
Shared equilibria.
Preprint. Under review.
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The second question that follows from this new concept is then how can we constrain Shared equilibria
so that they match specific externally-specified targets? The latter is referred to as calibration, where
we calibrate input parameters of the multi-agent system (MAS) so as to match externally-specified
calibration targets, typically coming from real-world observations on the emergent behaviors of
agents and groups of agents. For example, MAS modeling behaviors of people in a city may require
that agents in equilibria take the subway no more than some number of times a day in average.
Constraints such as those previously described can be achieved by having agents of different nature,
or types, and optimally balancing those types so as to match the desired targets on the emergent
behavior of agents. For example, we may want to optimally balance people living in the suburbs Vs.
living inside a city so as to match the constraint on taking the subway. Even then, repeating the steps
(i) pick a certain set of agent types, and (ii) train agents until equilibrium is reached and record the
associated calibration loss, is prohibitively expensive.
We solve this problem by introducing a reinforcement learning (RL) agent (RL calibrator) whose
goal is to optimally balance types of agents so as to match the calibration target, and crucially who
learns jointly with RL agents learning a shared equilibrium, avoiding the issue related to repeating
(i)-(ii). The result is CALSHEQ, a new dual-RL-based algorithm for calibration of shared equilibria
to external targets. CALSHEQ further innovates by calibrating parameters governing distributions of
agent types (called supertypes) rather than individual agents, allowing both behavior differentiation
among agents and coherent scaling of the shared policy network to multiple agents.
Our contributions are (1) we introduce the concept of Shared equilibrium that answers the question
on the nature of equilibria reached by agents of possibly different types using a shared policy, and
prove convergence to such equilibria using self-play, under certain conditions on the nature of the
game. (2) we introduce CALSHEQ, a novel dual-RL-based algorithm aimed at the calibration of
shared equilibria to externally specified targets, that innovates by introducing a RL-based calibrator
learning jointly with learning RL agents and optimally picking parameters governing distributions
of agent types, and show through experiments that CALSHEQ outperforms a Bayesian optimization
baseline.
Related work. Parameter sharing for agents having the same action and observation spaces has been
introduced concurrently in Foerster et al. (2016); Gupta et al. (2017), and then applied successfully in
the subsequent works Foerster et al. (2017); Kaushik et al. (2018); Rashid et al. (2018); Sukhbaatar
et al. (2016); Sunehag et al. (2018). Gupta et al. (2017) showed that out of the their three proposed
approaches, (TRPO-based) parameter sharing was the best performer. Although their work considers
a cooperative setting where agents maximize a joint reward, parameter sharing is actually the only
method out of their proposed three that doesn’t require reward sharing, and we exploit this fact in our
work. Hernandez-Leal et al. (2019) constitutes an excellent survey of recent work in multi-agent
deep RL. The recent paper Zheng et al. (2020) uses a shared policy for worker agents earning
individual rewards and paying tax. There, the RL-based tax planner shares some similarities with
our RL calibrator, although our calibrator is responsible for optimally picking agent type distribution
rather than public information observable by all agents, and updates its policy on a slower timescale
so as to allow equilibria to be reached by the shared policy.
The idea of using RL to calibrate parameters of a system probably goes back to Eiben et al. (2007),
in the context of evolutionary algorithms. As mentioned in the recent work Avegliano & Sichman
(2019), there is currently no consensus on how to calibrate parameters of agent-based models. Most
methods studied so far build a surrogate of the MAS Avegliano & Sichman (2019); Lamperti et al.
(2018). The term "surrogate" is very generic, and could be defined as a model that approximates
the mapping between the input parameters and some output metric of the MAS. Lamperti et al.
(2018) studies classifier surrogates, and in contrast to the latter and other work on calibration, our
work is based on a dual-RL approach where our RL calibrator learns jointly with RL agents learning
an equilibrium. In our experiments, we compare our approach to a Bayesian optimization baseline
that builds such a surrogate. Inverse RL Finn et al. (2016) could be used for calibration, but it aims
at recovering unknown rewards from input expert policy: in this work we don’t need the latter and
assume that rewards are known for each agent type, and that the goal is to find the optimal agent type
distribution.
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2 Shared Equilibria in General Sum Partially Observable Markov Games
Partially Observable Markov Game setting. We consider a n-player partially observable Markov
game Hansen et al. (2004) where all agents share the same action and state spaces A and S. We
make no specific assumption on the latter spaces unless specifically mentioned, and denote the joint
action and state as at := (a
(1)
t , ..., a
(n)
t ) and st := (s
(1)
t , ..., s
(n)
t ). We assume that each agent i can
only observe his own states s(i)t and actions a
(i)
t , hence the partial observability. To ease notational
burden, we use the notation s(i)t for the agents’ observations instead of the o
(i)
t traditionally used in
this context, since in our case the full state st is the concatenation of agents’ observations. The state
transition probability kernel T : Sn ×An × Sn → R is denoted T (st,at, s′t), and represents the
probability to reach the joint state s′t conditionally on agents being in the joint state st and taking the
joint action at. As in Gupta et al. (2017), our framework contains no explicit communication among
agents.
Agent types and supertypes. In order to differentiate agents, we assign to each agent i a supertype
Λi ∈ SΛ, with Λ := (Λi)i∈[1,n]. At the beginning of each episode, agent i is assigned a type λi ∈ Sλ
sampled probabilistically as a function of its supertype, namely λi ∼ pΛi for some probability density
function pΛi , and initial states s
(i)
0 are sampled independently according to µ0,λi . This is formally
equivalent to extending agents’ state space to S × Sλ, with a transition kernel that keeps λi constant
throughout an episode and equal to its randomly sampled value at t = 0. Supertypes are convenient
as they allow to think of agents in terms of distributions of agents, and not at individual level, which
allows to scale the simulation in a coherent way. In this way they can be seen as behavioral templates
according to which agents can be cloned. Typically, we create groups of agents who share the same
supertype, so that the number of distinct supertypes is typically much less than the number of agents.
Note that in Gupta et al. (2017), it is mentioned that the agent index can be included in its state: this
is the special case where the supertype is that number, and the type can only take one value equal to
the supertype.
Rewards. At each time t, agent i receives an individual rewardRλi(s(i)t ,at) which depends on his
own state, on the joint action profile of all agents, and on his type λi. In particular the game is general
sum, and agents do not share rewards.
Shared Policy. In the parameter sharing approach with decentralized execution Gupta et al. (2017);
Kaushik et al. (2018), agents use a common policy pi, which is a probability over individual
agent actions a(i)t given a local observation s
(i)
t . This policy is trained with the experiences of all
agents simultaneously, and allows different behaviors among agents since they have different local
observations. We innovate by including the agent type λi in the local observations and hence define
the shared policy over the extended agent state space S × Sλ. Denoting X the space of functions
S × Sλ → ∆(A), where ∆(A) is the space of probability distributions over actions, we then define:
X := [S × Sλ → ∆(A)] , pi(a|s, λ) := P [a(i)t ∈ da|s(i)t = s, λi = λ] , pi ∈ X . (1)
What are then the game theoretic implications of agents of different types using a shared policy?
Intuitively, assume 2 players are asked to submit algorithms to play chess that will compete against
each other. Starting with the white or dark pawns presents some similarities as it is chess in both cases,
but also fundamental differences, hence the algorithms need to be good in all situations, whatever
the type (white or dark) assigned by the random coin toss at the start of the game. The 2 players are
playing a higher-level game on the space of algorithms that requires the submitted algorithms to be
good in all situations. This also means we will consider games where there are "good" strategies,
formalized by the concept of extended transitivity in assumption 1, needed in theorem 1.
Value functions. Given that agents’ initial states are sampled independently according to the
distributions µ0,λi , we see that the expected reward of each agent i only depends on i) its supertype
Λi, ii) the supertype profile across all agents Λ := (Λi)i∈[1,n], and iii) the shared policy pi. Since we
work with a fixed supertype profile Λ for now, we actually have dependence on i) and iii) only. We
will actually need the following definition, which is slightly more general in that it allows agents
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j 6= i to use a different policy pi2 ∈ X , where γ ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor:
VΛi(pi1, pi2) := Eλi∼pΛi , a(i)t ∼pi1(·|·,λi)
λj∼pΛj , a
(j)
t ∼pi2(·|·,λj)
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtRλi(s(i)t ,at)
]
, i 6= j ∈ [1, n], pi1, pi2 ∈ X . (2)
VΛi(pi1, pi2) is to be interpreted as the expected reward of an agent of supertype Λi using pi1, while
all other agents are using pi2.
Shared Policy gradient. In the parameter sharing framework, pi ≡ piθ is a neural network with
weights θ, and the gradient∇sharedθ according to which the shared policy piθ is updated is computed
by collecting all agent experiences simultaneously and treating them as distinct sequences of local
states, actions and rewards s(i)t , a
(i)
t , Rλi(s(i)t ,at) experienced by the shared policy Gupta et al.
(2017), yielding the following expression under vanilla policy gradient, similar to the single-agent
case:
∇sharedθ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1
B
B∑
b=1
∞∑
t=0
∇θ lnpiθ
(
a
(i)
t,b|s(i)t,b, λi,b
) ∞∑
t′=t
γ(t
′−t)Rλi,b(s(i)t′,b,at′,b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=(Gi)
(3)
where B is the number of episodes sampled. Note that one may use an advantage critic in equation (3)
in place of the sampled rewardsRλi,b(s(i)t,b,at,b), but this is related to sample efficiency and doesn’t
change the methods and observations developed subsequently.
Proposition 1 is a key observation of this paper and sheds light upon the mechanism underlying
parameter sharing in (3): in order to update the shared policy, we a) set all agents to use the same
policy piθ and b) pick one agent at random and take a step towards improving his individual reward
while keeping other agents on piθ: by (4), this yields an unbiased estimate of the gradient∇sharedθ .
Sampling many agents at random α ∼ U [1, n] in order to compute the expectation in (4) will yield a
less noisy gradient estimate but will not change its bias.
Proposition 1. Let ∇θ1VΛi(piθ1 , piθ2) be the gradient of the function VΛi(piθ1 , piθ2) with respect to
its first argument. We then have:
∇sharedθ = ∇θ1 V̂ (piθ, piθ), V̂ (pi1, pi2) := Eα∼U [1,n] [VΛα(pi1, pi2)] , pi1, pi2 ∈ X (4)
where Eα∼U [1,n] indicates that the expectation is taken over α random integer in [1, n].
Proof. It is known (Lockhart et al. (2019) or Srinivasan et al. (2018) appendix D for a detailed
derivation) that the term (Gi) in (3) is nothing else than ∇θ1VΛi(piθ, piθ), that is the sensitivity of
the expected reward of an agent of supertype Λi to changing his policy while all other agents are
kept on piθ, cf. (2). The latter can be seen as an extension of the likelihood ratio method to imperfect
information games, and allows us to write concisely, using (3):
∇sharedθ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∇θ1VΛi(piθ, piθ) = ∇θ1
1
n
n∑
i=1
VΛi(piθ, piθ) = ∇θ1Eα∼U [1,n] [VΛα(piθ, piθ)]
Shared Equilibria. We remind Duersch (2012) that a 2-player game is said to be symmetric if the
utility received by a player only depends on his own strategy and on his opponent’s strategy, but not
on the player’s identity, and that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) is said to be symmetric if
pi∗1 = pi
∗
2 . For such games, due to symmetry, we call payoff(pi1, pi2) the utility received by a player
playing pi1 while the other player plays pi2.
Equation (4) suggests that the shared policy is a Nash equilibrium of the 2-player symmetric game
with payoff V̂ , where by our definition of the term "payoff", the first player receives V̂ (pi1, pi2) while
the other receives V̂ (pi2, pi1). This is because∇θ1 V̂ (piθ, piθ) in (4) corresponds to trying to improve
the utility of the first player while keeping the second player fixed, starting from the symmetric
point (piθ, piθ). If no such improvement is possible, we are facing by definition a symmetric Nash
equilibrium, since due to symmetry of the game, no improvement is possible either for the second
player starting from the same point (piθ, piθ). The game with payoff V̂ is a game where each element
of the strategy set (that is, every pure strategy) is a policy pi ∈ X defined in (1). This type of game has
been introduced in Balduzzi et al. (2019) as a Functional Form Game (FFG), since pure strategies of
these games are stochastic policies themselves. This motivates the following definition.
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Definition 1. (Shared Equilibrium) A shared (resp. −shared) equilibrium pi∗ associated to the
supertype profile Λ is defined as a pure strategy symmetric Nash (resp. −Nash) equilibrium (pi∗, pi∗)
of the 2-player symmetric game with pure strategy set X and payoff V̂ in (4).
Note that the previously described mechanism a)-b) occurring in parameter sharing is exactly what is
defined as self-play in Balduzzi et al. (2019) (algorithm 2), but for the game of definition 1 with
payoff V̂ . That is, we repeat the following steps for iterations n (i) set all agents on piθn (ii) pick
one agent at random and improve his reward according to the gradient update (4), thus finding a
new policy piθn+1 . The natural question is now under which conditions do Shared equilibria exist,
and can the self-play mechanism in (4) lead to such equilibria? We know Balduzzi et al. (2019)
that self-play is related to transitivity in games, so to answer this question, we introduce a new
concept of transitivity that we call extended transitivity as it constitutes a generalization to 2-player
symmetric general sum games of the concept of transitivity for the zero-sum case in Balduzzi et al.
(2019). There, such a transitive game has payoff t(pi1)− t(pi2). Since there is no coupling between
pi1 and pi2 in the latter, this game is equivalent to the symmetric (general sum) game with payoff
u(pi1, pi2) = t(pi1) for player 1, and u(pi2, pi1) = t(pi2) for player 2. One can observe that this payoff
u satisfies extended transitivity in assumption 1 with δ = , since there is no dependence on the
second coordinate of u.
Assumption 1. (extended transitivity) A 2-player symmetric game with pure strategy set S and
payoff u is said to be extended transitive if:
∀ > 0,∃δ > 0 : ∀x, y ∈ S : if u(y, x)− u(x, x) > , then u(y, y)− u(x, x) > δ.
The intuition behind this assumption is that if player 1 finds a "good" strategy y for himself while
player 2 is playing x, player 2 switching to y may not be as ideal to player 1 as if he were to stay
on x, but both players are better off both playing y than both playing x. In other words, there exists
"good" strategies for the game, which is intuitively the setting for games such as our n-player market
example in section 4. Assumption 1 will be required in theorem 1 to prove the existence of shared
equilibria, which is the main result of this section. Actually, it will be proved that such equilibria are
reached by following self-play previously discussed, thus showing that policy updates based on (4)
achieve -shared equilibria within a finite number of steps. In order to do so, we need definition 2 of
a self-play sequence, which is nothing else than a rigorous reformulation of the mechanism occurring
in self-play Balduzzi et al. (2019) (algo 2). For -shared equilibria, assumption 1 is sufficient, but for
shared equilibria, we need the continuity result in lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Assume that the rewards R are bounded. Then VΛi is continuous on X × X for all i,
where X is equipped with the total variation metric.
Definition 2. A (f, )-self-play sequence (xn, yn)0≤n≤2N of size 0 ≤ 2N ≤ +∞ is a sequence
such that for every n, x2n = y2n, consecutive elements (xn, yn), (xn+1, yn+1) differ at most by one
entry, and f(x2n+1, x2n) > f(x2n, x2n) + . Such a sequence is generated by (zn)n≥0 if x2n = zn
and x2n+1 = zn+1.
Theorem 1. Let Λ be a supertype profile. Assume that the symmetric 2-player game with pure
strategy set X and payoff V̂ is extended transitive, and that the rewards R are bounded. Then,
there exists an −shared equilibrium for every  > 0, which further can be reached within a finite
number of steps following a (V̂ , )-self-play sequence. Further, if S , A and Sλ are finite, then there
exists a shared equilibrium. In particular, if (piθn)n≥0 is a sequence of policies obtained following
the gradient update (4) with V̂ (piθn+1 , piθn) > V̂ (piθn , piθn) + , then (piθn)n≥0 generates a finite
(V̂ , )-self-play sequence and its endpoint (pi, pi) is an −shared equilibrium.
3 Calibration of Shared Equilibria
We now turn to the question of calibration, that is of acting on the supertype profile Λ so as to match
externally specified targets on the shared equilibrium. Given a game that satisfies the conditions of
theorem 1, we are guaranteed that agents will reach a shared equilibrium associated to Λ. For the
MAS to accurately model a given real world system, we would like the emergent behavior of agents
in that equilibrium to satisfy certain constraints. For example, in the n−player market setting of
section 4, one may want certain market participants to average a certain share of the total market in
terms of quantity of goods exchanged, or to only receive certain specific quantities of these goods.
5
Algorithm 1 (CALSHEQ) Calibration of Shared Equilibria
Input: learning rates (βcalm ), (βsheqm ) satisfying assumption 2, initial calibrator and shared policies
piΛ0 , pi0, initial supertype profile Λ
b
0 = Λ0 across episodes b ∈ [1, B].
Output: optimal calibrator and shared policies piΛ∗ , pi∗.
1: while piΛm, pim not converged do
2: for each episode b ∈ [1, B] do
3: Sample supertype increment δΛb ∼ piΛm(·|Λbm−1) and set Λbm := Λbm−1 + δΛb
4: Sample multi-agent episode with supertype profile Λbm and shared policy pim, with
λi ∼ pΛbm,i , a
(i)
t ∼ pim(·|·, λi), i ∈ [1, n] cf. (2)
5: update piΛm with learning rate β
cal
m based on gradient associated to (5) with episodes b ∈ [1, B]
6: update pim with learning rate βsheqm based on gradient (4) and episodes b ∈ [1, B]
Assumption 2. The learning rates (βcalm ), (βsheqm ) satisfy
βcalm
βsheqm
m→+∞→ 0, as well as the Robbins-
Monro conditions, that is their respective sum is infinite, and the sum of their squares is finite.
The difficulty is that for every choice of Λ, one should in principle train agents until equilibrium
is reached and record the associated calibration loss, and repeat this process until the loss is small
enough, which is prohibitively expensive. We solve this problem by introducing a RL calibrator
agent whose goal is to optimally pick Λ and who learns jointly with RL agents learning a shared
equilibrium, but - and this is key - under a two-timescale stochastic approximation framework Konda
& Tsitsiklis (2004). The latter is widely used in RL Dalal et al. (2018) and is specifically tailored to
our problem as it allows the RL calibrator’s policy to be updated more slowly than the agent’s shared
policy, yet simultaneously, giving enough time for equilibria to be reached. This fact is reflected in
assumption 2, standard under the two-timescale framework. In contrast, alternative methods such
as the baseline we explore in our experiments - Bayesian optimization - do not offer this possibility,
thus potentially leading to large moves in the supertype space which could prevent the shared policy
to correctly learn an equilibrium.
The RL calibrator’s state is the (stacked) current values of the supertypes Λi, and its action is a vector
of increments δΛi to apply to the supertypes, resulting in new supertypes Λi + δΛi, where typically
Λi takes value in some subset of Rd. This approach is in line with the literature on "learning to learn"
Andrychowicz et al. (2016), since the goal of the RL calibrator is to learn optimal directions to take
in the supertype space, given a current location. In practice, there is typically much less distinct
supertypes than agents and the RL calibrator’s state and action spaces only include those distinct
supertypes (agents sharing the same supertype being probabilistic clones of one another). The RL
calibrator has full knowledge of the joint states and actions st, at, and is given an externally specified
target f∗ ∈ R for a function of the form fcal((st,at)t≥0) possibly depending on the full state-action
path of an episode. Its reward will then be (the inverse of) a loss `−1(f∗ − fcal((st,at)t≥0)).
The result is algorithm 1, where at stage m = 1, the supertype profile Λ1 is sampled across episodes
b as Λb1 ∼ Λ0 + δΛb, with δΛb ∼ piΛ1 (·|Λ0) and where we denote piΛ1 := Λ0 + piΛ1 (·|Λ0) the
resulting distribution of Λ1. Then, we run multi-agent episodes b according to (2), each one of
them with its supertype profile Λb1, and record the reward rb := `
−1(f∗ − fcal((st,b,at,b)t≥0)),
thus corresponding to the calibrator state Λ0, and action δΛb. The process is repeated, yielding for
each episode b at stage m ≥ 2, Λbm ∼ Λbm−1 + piΛm(·|Λbm−1), resulting in an distribution piΛm for
Λm, empirically observed through the sampled {Λbm}b=1..B . As a result, the calibrator’s policy piΛ
maximizes the following objective at stage m:
V calibpim (pi
Λ
m) := EΛ∼piΛm−1,Λ′∼piΛm(·|Λ)+Λ, λi∼pΛ′
i
, a
(i)
t ∼pim(·|·,λi)
[
`−1(f∗ − fcal((st,at)t≥0))
]
(5)
Assumption 2 ensures Tamar et al. (2012) that piΛ is seen as "quasi-static" with respect to pi, and thus
that pim in (5) can be considered as having converged to a shared equilibrium depending on piΛm. pi
Λ
is then updated based on (5) using a classical single-agent RL gradient update. This process ensures
that piΛ is updated smoothly during training and learns optimal directions to take in the supertype
space, benefiting from the multiple locations Λbm experienced across episodes.
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4 Experiments in a n-player market setting
We conduct experiments in a n-player market setting where merchant agents buy/sell goods from/to
customers. Merchants try to attract customers and earn income by offering attractive prices to buy/sell
their goods, and a merchant i cannot observe prices offered by other merchants to customers, hence
the partial observability. We consider 2 distinct supertypes for 5-10 merchant agents (merchant
1 is assigned supertype 1 and the n − 1 others are assigned supertype 2), which are respectively
vectors of size 12 and 11, resulting in 23 parameters to calibrate in total. For each supertype we
have i) 10 probabilities to be connected to 10 clusters of 50 customers each (500 customers in total)
corresponding to transactions of various quantities, ii) the merchant’s tolerance to holding a large
inventory of goods (inventory tolerance - impacting his reward function), which is 1 parameter
for supertype 1, and the mean/variance of a normal random variable for supertype 2. In contrast,
experimental results in Lamperti et al. (2018) only calibrate 8 or 12 parameters (although not in
a RL context). The calibration targets we consider are related to i) the fraction of total customer
transactions that a merchant can attract (market share) and ii) the distribution of individual transactions
that a given merchant receives (the constraint is on 9 percentiles of the distribution, for each supertype).
A detailed description of the setting/experiments is presented in the supplementary.
Baseline and Performance metrics. There is currently no consensus on how to calibrate parameters
of agent-based models Avegliano & Sichman (2019), but existing literature suggests using surrogate-
based methods Lamperti et al. (2018). The baseline we consider here is Bayesian optimization
(BO), a method that has been used for hyperparameter optimization. The latter can be considered
as similar to this calibration task, and BO will allow us to periodically record the calibration loss
related to a certain choice of supertype Λ, and suggest an optimal point to try next, via building a
Gaussian Process-based surrogate of the MAS. We study 5 experimental settings fully described in
supplementary, and evaluate our findings according to the following criteria i) calibrator reward in (5),
quantifying the accuracy of the equilibrium fit to the target(s), ii) convergence of merchant agents’
rewards to an equilibrium and iii) smoothness of the supertype profile Λ as a function of training
iterations, ensuring that equilibria is given sufficient time to be reached, cf. discussion on assumption
2 in section 3.
Figure 1: Rewards during training - Calibrator (Top), Supertypes 1/2 (Mid/Bottom) - experiments
1-2-3-4. CALSHEQ (ours) and baseline (Bayesian optimization).
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Figure 2: Calibration target fits for transaction quantity distribution percentile and Market Share
during training - Experiments 2-2-2-3 (Top) and 3-4-5-5 (Bottom) - CALSHEQ (ours) and baseline
(Bayesian optimization).
Figure 3: Smoothness of supertype parameters being calibrated during training - Experiments 1-2-4-5
- CALSHEQ (ours) and baseline (Bayesian optimization).
Results. In figure 1 we display calibrator and agents’ reward evolution during training. It is seen
that CALSHEQ outperforms BO in that i) the RL calibrator’s rewards converge more smoothly
and achieve in average better results in less time, ii) in experiment 4, supertype 1’s reward in the
BO case converges to a negative value, which should not happen as merchants always have the
possibility to earn zero income by doing nothing. The reason for it is that as mentioned in section
3, BO can potentially perform larger moves in the supertype space when searching for a solution,
whereas CALSHEQ uses a two-timescale framework that prevents this fact, at least in theory, and
consequently merchants may not be given sufficient time to adapt to new supertype profiles Λ. This
fact is further seen in figure 3 where we show supertype parameters during training (connectivity and
inventory tolerance). It is seen that CALSHEQ smoothly varies these parameters, giving enough time
for merchant agents on the shared policy to adapt, and preventing rewards to diverge as previously
discussed.
The RL calibrator’s total reward in (5) is computed as weighted sum of various sub-objectives. In
figure 2, we zoom on some of these individual components that constitute the overall reward, together
with the associated externally specified target values (figures related to all sub-objectives of all
experiments are in the supplementary). It is seen that CALSHEQ converges more smoothly and
more accurately than BO to the target values. The considered targets are on the percentiles of the
distribution of the transaction quantities received by merchants, as well as on the market share. For
example, the first case considers a target of 8 for the 10% percentile of the distribution of transactions
received by a merchant of supertype 1.
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5 Conclusion
This work was first motivated by the authors wondering what were the game theoretical implications
of agents of possibly different types using a shared policy. This led to the concept of Shared
equilibrium presented in this paper, which provides insight into the mechanisms underlying policy
sharing. From the latter followed the natural question of how to constrain such equilibria by optimally
balancing types of agents. The result is a novel dual-RL based algorithm that operates under a two-
timescale stochastic approximation framework, CALSHEQ, for which we show through experiments
that it allows to smoothly bring learning agents to equilibria satisfying certain externally specified
constraints. We hope that the present work on calibration will constitute a new baseline and give
further ideas to researchers attempting to constrain/calibrate equilibria learnt by learning agents.
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A Proofs
Lemma 2. For an extended transitive symmetric game with bounded payoff f , every (f, )-self-play
sequence is finite for every  > 0.
Proof. First note that such a game has at least one (f, )-self-play sequence for every  > 0 since
every (x, x) is a (f, )-self-play sequence of size 0 (cf. definition 2). Then, let (xn, yn) be a (f, )-self-
play sequence. Therefore f(x2n+1, x2n) > f(x2n, x2n)+. By extended transitivity (cf. assumption
1) this implies f(x2n+1, x2n+1) > f(x2n, x2n) + δ. But by definition of the self-play sequence,
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f(x2n+1, x2n) > f(x2n, x2n) + , hence necessarily x2n+1 6= x2n. Since by definition of a self-play
sequence, two consecutive elements can only differ at most by one entry, and x2n+2 = y2n+2,
this implies y2n+1 = y2n and x2n+1 = x2n+2, hence f(x2n+2, x2n+2) > f(x2n, x2n) + δ. By
induction f(x2n, x2n) > f(x0, x0) + nδ. If the sequence is not finite and since δ > 0, one can
take the limit as n→∞ and get a contradiction, since f is bounded.
Theorem 2. An extended transitive symmetric game with bounded payoff f has a symmetric pure
strategy −Nash equilibrium for every  > 0, which further can be reached within a finite number of
steps following a (f, )-self-play sequence.
Proof. Let  > 0. Take a (f, )-self-play sequence. By lemma 2, such a sequence is finite, hence one
may take a (f, )-self-play sequence of maximal size, say 2N. Assume that its end point (x, x) is
not an −Nash equilibrium. Then ∃y: f(y, x) > f(x, x) + , which means that one can extend the
(f, )-self-play sequence to size 2N + 2 with entries (y, x) and (y, y), which violates the fact that
such a sequence was taken of maximal size.
Theorem 3. An extended transitive symmetric game with bounded, continuous payoff f and compact
strategy set has a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. By theorem 2, take a sequence of n-Nash equilibria with n → 0 and corresponding
(f, n)-self-play sequence endpoints (xn, xn). By compactness assumption, this sequence has a
converging subsequence (xmn , xmn), whose limit point (x∗, x∗) belongs to the strategy set. We have
by definition of mn -Nash equilibrium that f(xmn , xmn) ≥ supy f(y, xmn)− mn . Taking the limit
as n→∞ and using continuity of f , we get f(x∗, x∗) ≥ supy f(y, x∗), which shows that (x∗, x∗)
is a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1. Let Λ be a supertype profile. Assume that the symmetric 2-player game with pure
strategy set X and payoff V̂ is extended transitive, and that the rewards R are bounded. Then,
there exists an −shared equilibrium for every  > 0, which further can be reached within a finite
number of steps following a (V̂ , )-self-play sequence. Further, if S , A and Sλ are finite, then there
exists a shared equilibrium. In particular, if (piθn)n≥0 is a sequence of policies obtained following
the gradient update (4) with V̂ (piθn+1 , piθn) > V̂ (piθn , piθn) + , then (piθn)n≥0 generates a finite
(V̂ , )-self-play sequence and its endpoint (pi, pi) is an −shared equilibrium.
Proof. The first part of the theorem follows from theorem 2, since by assumptionR (and hence V̂ ) is
bounded.
Then, we have by assumption that S , A, Sλ are finite. Denote m := |S| · |A| · |Sλ|. In that case X is
given by:
X = {(xs,λa ) ∈ [0, 1]m : ∀s ∈ [1, |S|], λ ∈ [1, |Sλ|],
|A|∑
a=1
xs,λa = 1}
X is a closed and bounded subset of [0, 1]m, hence by Heine–Borel theorem it is compact. Note
that closedness comes from the fact that summation to 1 is preserved by passing to the limit. By
assumption, the rewards are bounded, and by lemma 1, VΛi is continuous for all i, which yields
continuity of V̂ , hence we can apply theorem 3 to conclude.
Finally, if (piθn)n≥0 is a sequence of policies obtained following the gradient update (4) with
V̂ (piθn+1 , piθn) > V̂ (piθn , piθn) + , then the self-play sequence generated by (piθn)n≥0 is finite by
lemma 2, and its endpoint is necessarily a symmetric pure strategy -Nash equilibrium according to
the proof of theorem 2, hence an -shared equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Assume that the rewards R are bounded. Then VΛi is continuous on X × X for all i,
where X is equipped with the total variation metric.
Proof. Let us denote ρTV (pi1, pi2) the total variation metric, and let us equip X × X with the metric:
ρTV ((pi1, pi2), (pi3, pi4)) := ρTV (pi1, pi3) + ρTV (pi2, pi4)
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Let:
VΛi(pi1, pi2, s,λ) := Ea(i)t ∼pi1, a(j)t ∼pi2
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtRλi(s(i)t ,at)|s0 = s
]
, j 6= i,
so that:
VΛi(pi1, pi2) =
∫
s
∫
λ
VΛi(pi1, pi2, s,λ) ·Πnj=1[µ0,λj (dsj)pΛj (dλj)]
Then we have:
VΛi(pi1, pi2, s,λ) =
∫
a
Rλi(si,a)pi1(dai|si, λi)Πj 6=ipi2(daj |sj , λj)
+ γ
∫
a
∫
s′
T (s,a, ds′)VΛi(pi1, pi2)(s′,λ)pi1(dai|si, λi)Πj 6=ipi2(daj |sj , λj)
The goal is to compute |VΛi(pi1, pi2, s,λ) − VΛi(pi3, pi4, s,λ)| and show that the latter is small
provided that ρTV ((pi1, pi2), (pi3, pi4)) is small. Let us use the notation:
c1(pi1, pi2) :=
∫
a
Rλi(si,a)pi1(dai|si, λi)Πj 6=ipi2(daj |sj , λj)
Since by assumption |R| is bounded, say byRmax we have by property of the total variation metric
that:
|c1(pi1, pi2)− c1(pi3, pi4)| ≤ nRmaxρTV ((pi1, pi2), (pi3, pi4))
Let us use the notation:
c2(pi1, pi2) := γ
∫
a
∫
s′
T (s,a, ds′)VΛi(pi1, pi2)(s′,λ)pi1(dai|si, λi)Πj 6=ipi2(daj |sj , λj)
For the second term |c2(pi1, pi2)− c2(pi3, pi4)|, we can split:
VΛi(pi1, pi2)(s
′,λ)pi1(dai|si, λi)Πj 6=ipi2(daj |sj , λj)
− VΛi(pi3, pi4)(s′,λ)pi3(dai|si, λi)Πj 6=ipi4(daj |sj , λj)
= VΛi(pi1, pi2)(s
′,λ)[pi1(dai|si, λi)Πj 6=ipi2(daj |sj , λj)− pi3(dai|si, λi)Πj 6=ipi4(daj |sj , λj)]
+pi3(dai|si, λi)Πj 6=ipi4(daj |sj , λj)[VΛi(pi1, pi2)(s′,λ)− VΛi(pi3, pi4)(s′,λ)]
Since VΛi is bounded byRmax(1− γ)−1, we have:
|c2(pi1, pi2)− c2(pi3, pi4)| ≤ Rmax(1− γ)−1ρTV ((pi1, pi2), (pi3, pi4))
+ γ sup
s′∈S
|VΛi(pi1, pi2, s′,λ)− VΛi(pi3, pi4, s′,λ)|
Note that the supremum in the above equation is finite since it is bounded by 2Rmax(1− γ)−1. We
then have, collecting all terms together:
|VΛi(pi1, pi2, s,λ)− VΛi(pi3, pi4, s,λ)| ≤ Rmax(n+ (1− γ)−1)ρTV ((pi1, pi2), (pi3, pi4))
+ γ sup
s′∈S
|VΛi(pi1, pi2, s′,λ)− VΛi(pi3, pi4, s′,λ)|
Taking the supremum over s ∈ S on the left hand-side and rearranging terms finally yields:
sup
s∈S
|VΛi(pi1, pi2, s,λ)− VΛi(pi3, pi4, s,λ)|
≤ (1− γ)−1Rmax(n+ (1− γ)−1)ρTV ((pi1, pi2), (pi3, pi4)),
which yields the desired continuity result.
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B Experiments: details and complete set of results
B.1 Description of the n-player market setting and of the merchant agents on a shared
policy
We implemented a simulator of a market where merchant agents i offer prices p(i)buy,t, p
(i)
sell,t to
customers at which they are willing to buy and sell a certain good, for example coffee, from/to them.
A given merchant i cannot observe the prices that his competitors j 6= i are offering to customers,
hence the partially observed setting.
There exists a reference facility that all merchants and customers can observe and can transact with
at buy/sell prices p∗buy,t, p
∗
sell,t publicly available at all times. Consequently, if a merchant offers
to a customer a price less attractive than the reference price, the customer will prefer to transact
with the reference facility instead. p∗buy,t, p
∗
sell,t are assumed to be of the form p
∗
buy,t = m
∗
t − δ∗t ,
p∗sell,t = m
∗
t + δ
∗
t , where bothm
∗
t , δ
∗
t have Gaussian increments over each timestep and δ
∗
t ≥ 0.
A merchant i’s inventory z(i)t is the net quantity of good that remains in his hands as a result of all
transactions performed with customers and the reference facility up to time t. We assume that it is
permitted to sell on credit, so that inventory z(i)t can be negative.
We have denoted the prices in bold letters since these prices are in fact functions of the quantity q
that is being transacted, for example p(i)buy,t ≡ q → p(i)buy,t(q). In order to simplify the setting, we
assume that merchants’ actions a(i)t only consist in i) specifying multiplicative buy/sell factors 
(i)
t,b,

(i)
t,s ∈ [−1, 1] on top of the reference curve to generate price curves: p(i)buy,t := p∗buy,t(1 + (i)t,b),
p
(i)
sell,t := p
∗
sell,t(1 + 
(i)
t,s) and ii) specifying a fraction h
(i)
t ∈ [0, 1] of current inventory z(i)t to
transact at the reference facility, so that a(i)t = (
(i)
t,b, 
(i)
t,s, h
(i)
t ) ∈ [−1, 1]2 × [0, 1]. The merchant’s
state s(i)t ∈ Rd with d ∼ 500 consist in the reference price and his recent transaction history with all
customers, in particular his inventory.
Merchants’ rewardRλi(s(i)t ,at) depend on other merchant’s prices and consist in the profit made
as a result of i) transactions performed with customers and the reference facility and ii) the change in
inventory’s value due to possible fluctuations of the reference price.
Customers are assumed at every point in time t to either want to buy or sell with equal probability
a certain quantity. We split 500 customers into 10 customer clusters, cluster i ∈ [1, 10] being
associated to quantity i. For example, a customer belonging to cluster 5 will generate transactions of
quantity 5.
Types and supertypes. In our setting, merchants differ by 1) their connectivity to customers (they
can transact only with connected customers) and 2) their inventory tolerance factor ξi, which
penalizes holding a large inventory by adding a term −ξi|z(i)t | to their reward Rλi(s(i)t ,at). We
define the supertype Λi as a vector of size 12: 10 probabilities of being connected to customers
belonging to the 10 customer clusters, plus the mean and standard deviation of the normal distribution
generating the merchant’s inventory tolerance coefficient ξi 1. In a given episode, a merchant may
be connected differently to customers in the same cluster, however he has the same probability to
be connected to them. That means that the type λi sampled probabilistically at the beginning of
each episode is a vector of size 11: 10 entries in [0, 1] corresponding to the sampled fractions of
connected customers in each one of the 10 clusters, and 1 inventory tolerance factor. For example,
if a merchant has in its supertype a probability 30% to be connected to customers in cluster 5, then
each one of the 50 binary connections between the merchant and customers of cluster 5 will be
sampled independently at the beginning of the episode as a Bernoulli random number with associated
probability 30%, and the resulting fraction of connected customers is recorded in λi.
Calibration targets. We consider calibration targets of two different types. The market share of a
specific merchant i is defined as the fraction of the sum of all customers’ transaction quantities (over
an episode) that merchant i has obtained. Note that the sum of market share over merchant’s doesn’t
1in experiments of section B.3, we set the standard deviation of the normal distribution associated to inventory
tolerance of supertype 1 to be zero since supertype 1 is associated to 1 merchant only
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necessarily sum to 1 since customers can transact with the reference facility if the merchant’s prices
are not attractive enough. The transaction distribution is defined as percentiles of the distribution
- over an episode - of transaction quantities per timestep received by a merchant as a result of his
interactions with all customers.
B.2 RL calibrator agent
As described in section 3, the state of the RL calibrator is the current supertype profile Λ and its
action is a supertype profile increment δΛ. In section B.1, we described the supertype Λi for each
merchant as a vector of size 12, and in section 4 we mentioned that we conducted experiments using 2
distinct supertypes for the 5-10 merchant agents (see also section B.3 for a more detailed description).
As a result, both the calibrator’s state Λ and action δΛ consist of the 12 supertype entries for 2
distinct supertypes, i.e. 24 real numbers. In our experiments, we set the standard deviation of the
normal distribution associated to inventory tolerance of supertype 1 to be zero since supertype 1 is
associated to 1 merchant only, which reduces the size to 23 real numbers. The corresponding ranges
for the parameters (Λi(j))j=1..12 in the RL calibrator’s policy action and state spaces are reported in
table 1.
Table 1: RL calibrator state and action spaces.
Supertype parameter flavor j state Λi(j) range action δΛi(j) range
customer cluster connectivity probability [0, 1] [−1, 1]
inventory tolerance Gaussian mean [0, 5] [−5, 5]
inventory tolerance Gaussian stDev [0, 2] [−2, 2]
As mentioned in section 3, the calibrator agent’s reward rb associated to an episode b is given by the
inverse of a loss:
rb = `
−1(f∗ − fcal((st,b,at,b)t≥0))
where f∗ ∈ R is a target for a function fcal((st,at)t≥0) depending on values taken by the joint state
and action profiles during an episode. In practice, we consider simultaneously K sub-objectives
associated to targets f (k)∗ , and set f∗ :=
∑K
k=1 wkf
(k)
∗ for weights wk, fcal((st,b,at,b)t≥0) :=∑K
k=1 wkf
(k)
cal ((st,b,at,b)t≥0), and:
rb = `
−1(f∗ − fcal((st,b,at,b)t≥0)) :=
K∑
k=1
wk
r
(k)
b︷ ︸︸ ︷
`−1k (f
(k)
∗ − f (k)cal ((st,b,at,b)t≥0)) (6)
We give in table 3 a breakdown of these sub-objectives for each experiment (for each experiment, all
K sub-objectives are required to be achieved simultaneously, cf. equation (6) above). Table 3 is asso-
ciated with reward functions mentioned below, where we denote msuper1 = msuper1((st,at)t≥0)
the market share of supertype 1 observed throughout an episode, mtotal the sum of all merchants’
marketshares, v̂superj (p) the observed (10p)
th% percentile of supertype j’s transaction distribution
per timestep.
In experiment 1, r = (1 + r(1) + 0.2r(2))−1, with vsuper1 = [8, 8, 8, 9, 9, 9, 10, 10, 10], r
(1) =
1
2 (max(0.15−msuper1 , 0) + max(0.8−mtotal, 0)), r(2) = 19
∑9
p=1 |vsuper1(p)− v̂super1(p)|.
In experiment 2/3, r = (1 + r(1) + 0.2r(2) + 0.2r(3))−1, with vsuper1 = [8, 8, 8, 9, 9, 9, 10, 10, 10],
vsuper2 = [2, 3, 3, 4, 5, 5, 6, 6, 7], r
(1) = 12 (max(0.15 − msuper1 , 0) + max(0.8 − mtotal, 0)),
r(j+1) = 19
∑9
p=1 |vsuperj (p)− v̂superj (p)|, j ∈ {1, 2}.
In experiment 4, r = (1+r(1) +r(2))−1, with r(1) = |0.25−msuper1 |, r(2) = max(0.8−mtotal, 0).
In experiment 5, r = (1 + r(1) + r(2))−1, with r(1) = |0.4−msuper1 |, r(2) = |0.8−mtotal|.
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B.3 Details on experiments
Experiments were conducted in the RLlib multi-agent framework Liang et al. (2018), ran on AWS
using a EC2 C5 24xlarge instance with 96 CPUs, resulting in a training time of approximately 1 day
per experiment.
The 5 experiments we conducted are described in table 2, with a calibration target breakdown in table
3 (see section B.1 for a description of the market setting and merchant agents, and section B.2 for a
description of the RL calibrator agent’s state, actions and rewards). For example, according to table
3, in experiment 1, we calibrate 23 parameters altogether in order to achieve 11 calibration targets
simultaneously. As mentioned in section 4, in all experiments, merchant 1 was assigned supertype 1,
and all n− 1 other merchants were assigned supertype 2.
Shared Policy and calibrator’s policy. Both policies were trained jointly according to algorithm 1
using Proximal Policy Optimization Schulman et al. (2017), an extension of TRPO Schulman et al.
(2015). We used configuration parameters in line with Schulman et al. (2017), that is a clip parameter
of 0.3, an adaptive KL penalty with a KL target of 0.01 and a learning rate of 10−4. We found that
entropy regularization was not specifically helpful in our case. Episodes were taken of length 60 time
steps with a discount factor of 1, using B = 90 parallel runs in between policy updates (for both
policies). As a result, each policy update was performed with a batch size of n · 60 · 90 timesteps for
the shared policy, and 3 · 90 timesteps for the calibrator’s policy, as we allowed the calibrator to take
3 actions per episode (that is, updating the supertype profile Λ 3 times), together with 30 iterations
of stochastic gradient descent. We used for each policy a fully connected neural net with 2 hidden
layers, 256 nodes per layer, and tanh activation. Since our action space is continuous, the output of
the neural net is the mean of a standard normal distribution, which is then used to sample actions
probabilistically.
Bayesian optimization baseline. We used Bayesian optimization to suggest a next supertype profile
Λ to try next, every M training iterations of the shared policy. That is, every M training iterations,
we record the calibrator’s reward as in section B.2, and use Bayesian optimization to suggest the
next best Λ to try. We empirically noticed that if M was taken too low (M ∼ 10), the shared policy
couldn’t adapt as the supertype profile changes were too frequent (and potentially too drastic). We
tested values of M = 10, M = 50, M = 100, M = 200, and opted for M = 100 as we found it
was a good trade-off between doing sufficiently frequent supertype profile updates and at the same
time giving enough time to the shared policy to adapt. We chose an acquisition function of upper
confidence bound (UCB) type Srinivas et al. (2016). Given the nature of our problem where agents
on the shared policy need to be given sufficient time to adapt to a new supertype profile choice Λ,
we opted for a relatively low UCB exploration parameter of β = 0.5, which we empirically found
yielded a good trade-off between exploration and exploitation (taking high exploration coefficient
can yield drastic changes in the supertype profile space, which can prevent agents to learn correctly
an equilibrium). Taking an acquisition function of expected improvement type yielded a similar
performance, cf. figure 4. The covariance function of the Gaussian process was set to a Matern kernel
with ν = 2.5.
Figure 4: Calibrator Reward during training - Experiment 1 - BO UCB with exploration parameter
β = 0.5, BO Expected Improvement (EI).
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Table 2: Summary of experiment configuration.
Experiment # # MerchantAgents
Budget # Training
Steps (106)
# distinct
Supertypes
# Supertype parameters
to be calibrated
Total #
Calibration Targets
1 5 40 2 20 11
2 5 40 2 20 20
3 10 20 2 20 20
4 10 20 2 23 2
5 5 40 2 23 2
Table 3: Calibration target breakdown
Experiment # # CalibrationTargets Calibration Target Type
1 9 transaction quantity distribution supertype 1percentiles 10%− 90% target 8, 8, 8, 9, 9, 9, 10, 10, 10
2 market share supertype 1≥ 15% + total≥ 80%
2 18
transaction quantity distribution Supertypes 1+2
supertype 1 - percentiles 10%− 90% target 8, 8, 8, 9, 9, 9, 10, 10, 10
supertype 2 - percentiles 10%− 90% target 2, 3, 3, 4, 5, 5, 6, 6, 7
2 market share supertype 1≥ 15% + total≥ 80%
3 18
transaction quantity distribution Supertypes 1+2
supertype 1 - percentiles 10%− 90% target 8, 8, 8, 9, 9, 9, 10, 10, 10
supertype 2 - percentiles 10%− 90% target 2, 3, 3, 4, 5, 5, 6, 6, 7
2 market share supertype 1≥ 15% + total≥ 80%
4 1 market share supertype 1 = 25%
1 total market share≥ 80%
5 1 market share supertype 1 = 40%
1 total market share = 80%
B.4 Complete set of experimental results associated to section 4
In this section we display the complete set of results associated to figures shown in section 4. We
display in figure 5 the rewards of all agents during training (calibrator, merchant on supertype 1 and
n− 1 merchants on supertype 2) for experiments 1-5 previously described. In figures 6-10 we display
the calibration fits for all calibration targets described in table 3 (we reiterate that for each experiment,
all calibration targets are required to be achieved simultaneously). In figures 11-15 we display the
calibrated parameters associated to the calibration fits, that is the parameters in supertypes 1 and
2 (customer connectivity probability and inventory tolerance Gaussian mean and stDev) that allow
to reach the calibration targets. As discussed in section 4, CALSHEQ outperforms BO in terms of
efficiency, accuracy of the fit, and smoothness.
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Figure 5: Rewards during training - Calibrator (Top), Supertypes 1/2 (Mid/Bottom) - experiments
1-2-3-4-5, respectively 5-5-10-10-5 agents. CALSHEQ (ours) and baseline (Bayesian optimization).
Figure 6: Experiment 1 - Calibration target fit for transaction quantity distribution percentile and
Market Share during training. Dashed line target indicates that the constraint was set to be greater
than target (not equal to it). CALSHEQ (ours) and baseline (Bayesian optimization).
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Figure 7: Experiment 2 - Calibration target fit for transaction quantity distribution percentile and
Market Share during training. Dashed line target indicates that the constraint was set to be greater
than target (not equal to it). CALSHEQ (ours) and baseline (Bayesian optimization).
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Figure 8: Experiment 3 - Calibration target fit for transaction quantity distribution percentile and
Market Share during training. Dashed line target indicates that the constraint was set to be greater
than target (not equal to it). CALSHEQ (ours) and baseline (Bayesian optimization).
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Figure 9: Experiment 4 - Calibration target fit for Market Share during training. Dashed line target
indicates that the constraint was set to be greater than target (not equal to it). CALSHEQ (ours) and
baseline (Bayesian optimization).
Figure 10: Experiment 5 - Calibration target fit for Market Share during training. CALSHEQ (ours)
and baseline (Bayesian optimization).
20
Figure 11: Experiment 1 - Calibrated parameters. CALSHEQ (ours) and baseline (Bayesian optimiza-
tion).
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Figure 12: Experiment 2 - Calibrated parameters. CALSHEQ (ours) and baseline (Bayesian optimiza-
tion).
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Figure 13: Experiment 3 - Calibrated parameters. CALSHEQ (ours) and baseline (Bayesian optimiza-
tion).
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Figure 14: Experiment 4 - Calibrated parameters. CALSHEQ (ours) and baseline (Bayesian optimiza-
tion).
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Figure 15: Experiment 5 - Calibrated parameters. CALSHEQ (ours) and baseline (Bayesian optimiza-
tion).
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